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FOREWORD
In April 2005, Oxfam Australia approached the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research to undertake 
a brief consultancy to a tight time frame on the issue of land rights reform. Oxfam was concerned at the 
escalating media coverage of views that associated Indigenous economic disadvantage, and housing and 
infrastructure shortages, with land rights and native title. Such views were emanating from a variety of 
powerful sources including the National Indigenous Council, publications from the Centre for Independent 
Studies (an infl uential think tank), and the Prime Minister of Australia. The focus of such views was the 
communal and inalienable nature of much of the Indigenous estate that has grown incrementally over 
the past 30 years to about one million square kilometres. There were various proposals being put forward 
suggesting that privatising or individuating this land might generate better economic and social outcomes 
for Indigenous people, especially in remote and very remote Australia.
This discussion paper seeks to address this issue in two ways; by reviewing the existing literature and by 
examining recently available statistics, especially on Indigenous housing need and affordability. The paper 
focuses most specifi cally on the situation in the Northern Territory for a variety of reasons. First, land rights 
is most deeply embedded and extensive in this jurisdiction. Second, there is no doubt that some of the 
most intractable development, housing and infrastructure issues facing remote Indigenous communities 
are evident in the Northern Territory. And third, Oxfam Australia believes that the Aboriginal Land Rights 
(Northern Territory) Act 1976, as Commonwealth statute, is the piece of rights-related legislation that is 
most vulnerable to amendment given that the Howard government now holds a Senate majority. 
A version of this paper was provided to Oxfam Australia in July 2005. In preparing it, the authors were asked 
to keep a general lay audience in mind; given the complexity of the issues, this has been a diffi cult request 
to meet. The authors of the paper were certainly keen that the version that Oxfam published in August 
2005 should be as accessible as possible and we hope that this has been achieved. This Discussion Paper is 
another version of the original paper. It is intended for a slightly different audience—for the academic and 
Indigenous policy communities, and for Indigenous organisations—in the interests of wide dissemination 
and of transparency.
Professor Jon Altman
Director, CAEPR
September 2005
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ABSTRACT
There has been escalating media coverage of the view that Indigenous economic disadvantage and housing 
and infrastructure shortages are linked to communal title to land resulting from land rights and native 
title. A variety of powerful fi gures have been suggesting that privatizing or individuating this land might 
generate better economic and social outcomes for Indigenous people, especially in remote and very remote 
Australia.
This Discussion Paper challenges this view in two ways; by reviewing the existing literature and by examining 
recently available statistics, especially on Indigenous housing need and affordability. The paper focuses 
most specifi cally on the situation in the Northern Territory for a variety of reasons. First, land rights are 
most deeply embedded and extensive in this jurisdiction. Second, there is no doubt that some of the most 
intractable development, housing and infrastructure issues facing remote Indigenous communities are 
evident in the Northern Territory.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Recent policy debate on Indigenous disadvantage has centred on the extent to which conferring private individual ownership of, and title to, land can increase economic development and address the acute 
housing needs that obtain in rural and remote Indigenous communities.
Proponents of the privatisation initiative suggest that individual ownership of land will result in higher rates 
of economic growth and improved housing in remote Indigenous communities by providing incentives for 
individuals or families to raise fi nance, establish business ventures and build and maintain housing.
As a contribution to this debate, Oxfam Australia commissioned the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy 
Research (CAEPR) at the Australian National University (ANU) to examine this issue through a literature-
based case study focusing on Aboriginal land in the Northern Territory. This report investigates the extent 
to which individual ownership of land is likely to boost economic development of Aboriginal lands and 
produce better housing outcomes through examining the provisions of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern 
Territory) Act 1976 (Cwlth) (ALRA).
This research confi rms that there is deeply entrenched Indigenous disadvantage on Aboriginal land in the 
Northern Territory expressed in many forms, including housing. However, it fi nds no evidence to suggest that 
individual ownership of land is either necessary or suffi cient to increase rates of economic development or 
housing construction on Aboriginal land in the Northern Territory.
The evidence does not support the notion that individual ownership of low-value land in remote settings can 
be the driving force in lifting home ownership in these regions. Historic shortfalls in housing and associated 
infrastructure provision and contemporary Indigenous poverty remain the principal issues that need to 
be addressed fi rst in any new policy framework directed to economic development and housing needs on 
Aboriginal lands. Similarly, the notion that land rights reform can unilaterally drive economic development 
should be reconsidered in light of cultural difference, the legacy of disadvantage, and structural factors 
faced by Indigenous communities on Aboriginal land in the Northern Territory.
This research concludes that there are far more signifi cant structural issues that must be addressed in order 
to encourage greater economic development and address housing needs. These structural factors include the 
remoteness of communities from mainstream markets, relatively low populations and population densities, 
the need for greater investment in education and vocational skills, poor infrastructure, and the generally 
economically marginal nature of most lands held under Aboriginal title. In addition, there are fundamental 
Aboriginal cultural reasons for attachment to land, irrespective of whether that land has current commercial 
use or potential.
This research confi rms that the ALRA statutory framework is presently capable of meeting Indigenous 
housing and economic development objectives. However, present levels of Ministerial involvement in 
decision-making about land use are excessive and burdensome by contemporary standards. Furthermore, 
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state agency occupation of Aboriginal-owned land generally remains on a non-commercial footing, largely 
to the disadvantage of Indigenous landowners and interests.
Experience in nearby New Zealand demonstrates that individualising land title can actually compromise 
the development of a sustainable economic base on Mãori-owned land. Innovative policy settings and 
partnerships are now used to address long-term consequences of economic marginalisation, as well as 
specifi c issues, including home ownership on Mãori-owned land. An important lesson from New Zealand 
is that fragmentation of land interests can create unhelpful barriers between people and increase costs 
associated with asset management. These problems should be avoided in Australia when considering how 
best to provide housing on communally-owned land.
Our recommendations are summarised as follows and detailed in the conclusion to the paper:
ALRA—careful analysis of what can currently be achieved under ALRA is needed, with any amendments 
focusing on diminishing the present role of the state in controlling land use decisions while retaining checks 
and balances necessary to protect owners’ rights. State use of Aboriginal land should be put on a more 
business-like footing as part of a larger process to encourage realisation of opportunities presented by land 
ownership.
Housing—because of high levels of Indigenous poverty and unmet housing need, policy reform should 
clearly recognise the ongoing requirement for enhanced state investment in community, and possibly 
publicly-owned, housing on Aboriginal land. Any reform should only follow exploration of structural 
changes that might enhance prospects for public housing, community housing, and private housing all on 
secure leases, as viable and sustainable options on Aboriginal land.
Economic development—given that Indigenous aspirations for development might differ from those of 
mainstream Australians, and what is realistically possible and sustainable on most Aboriginal land certainly 
differs from other areas of the country, we recommend careful consideration be given to more equitable 
resourcing of successful land management work, especially in natural and cultural resource management. 
This should occur alongside exploration of innovative forms of development fi nance for mainstream and 
Indigenous businesses. Options for making better use of development capital already generated by the ALRA 
framework and other avenues should be explored.
New Zealand—there are lessons to take from negative aspects of New Zealand’s experience of individualising 
land interests in the past. More recent innovative moves to provide greater support for collective land use 
and housing on multiply-owned Mãori land also need to be considered.
Conclusion—economic development on Aboriginal land has been blighted in the past by initiatives that 
were poorly matched to economic, social, cultural and biophysical realities. That pattern of failure will not be 
broken by reforms based on uncritical commitment to particular forms of private ownership. An evidence-
based approach is needed that will draw on analysis of the real achievements of ALRA and on international 
experience of the benefi ts to be derived from communal land ownership.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The conduct of Indigenous affairs in Australia over the past two years has undergone a fundamental shift. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), the national Indigenous representative 
organisation, was effectively abolished in early 2004 and replaced, after the October 2004 federal election, 
by the National Indigenous Council (NIC), an appointed advisory board. At the same time, popular discourse 
has increasingly represented the Indigenous policy framework and associated policies of the past 30 years as 
a failure, despite the ready availability of offi cial social indicators that show improvement in most areas at 
the national level (Altman, Biddle & Hunter 2004). From 1 July 2004 the introduction of new administrative 
arrangements has seen a change in key planks of policy, from concepts such as self determination, self 
management and Indigenous specifi c programs to those of mutual obligation, shared responsibility and 
mainstreaming.
From 1 July 2005 the Liberal-National Coalition has control of both Houses of the Australian Parliament, 
providing a clear opportunity for legislative reform. In the period since the last federal election there have 
been a number of discussion papers and ministerial presentations that have reinforced the discourse of 
policy failure. Those contributions have also sought to question the role of land rights and native title as 
perpetuating, rather than addressing, relative Indigenous disadvantage. 
Land rights laws in Australia have a history that extends back to the 1960s. South Australia introduced the 
fi rst land rights law in 1966, but this Act did not authorise claims. A decade later, the Australian Parliament 
passed the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (ALRA), which remains the most extensive 
land rights legislation implemented in Australia. Since 1966, substantial amounts of land have been returned, 
in one way or another, to Indigenous ownership. Pollack (2001) estimates that Indigenous Australians own, 
control, or have management arrangements over up to 18 per cent of the Australian continent, or around 
1 million square kilometres. It is likely that by 2005, with recent signifi cant native title determinations, this 
proportion has increased to perhaps 20 per cent of Australia. Available recent statistics (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (ABS) 2004a, 2004b) indicate that Indigenous people living in remote and very remote Australia, 
where most land transfers have occurred, have the lowest socioeconomic status, both relative to other 
Indigenous Australians and to non-Indigenous Australians. 
This Discussion Paper focuses on the situation in the Northern Territory of Australia where Aboriginal people 
have seen 44 per cent of the land mass returned to Aboriginal ownership under ALRA.1 This amounts to an 
area of 594,000 square kilometres, with a further 9.6 per cent (or 120,000 sq kms) subject to claim.2 Being 
Commonwealth law, the ALRA is amenable to reform by the Australian Parliament—reform that has rarely 
occurred owing to party-partisan standoffs and Indigenous opposition in the last 28 years. Research by 
Taylor (2003) estimates that a large proportion (over 70%) of the Northern Territory Indigenous population 
resides on Aboriginal-owned land; furthermore, Taylor (2002) estimates that this population is likely to 
grow rapidly in the next 20 years. Despite the very substantial amount of land that has been transferred to 
Indigenous people in this jurisdiction, there is evidence that some discrete Indigenous communities are in 
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economic and social crisis. In many, there is a large shortfall of housing and much of the existing housing 
stock is in a poor state of repair (Taylor 2004). There is no question that there are housing and economic 
development problems on Aboriginal land in the Northern Territory and that population growth is likely to 
exacerbate such problems. 
This outcome can be partially explained by residence in geographically remote areas, but also by the failure 
of governments to provide adequate service delivery to remote Aboriginal communities. It can also be 
explained, in part, by the fact that the Aboriginal reserve areas and unalienated Crown land that have formed 
the vast majority of land returned to Indigenous ownership have had marginal commercial value—hence the 
availability for claim in the case of unallocated Crown land. Furthermore, while substantial tracts of land 
have been returned to Indigenous ownership, this restitution did not generally include property rights in 
commercially valuable resources that have the potential to make more of a difference. 
It is often overlooked that historically land rights policy has encompassed both social justice and 
development goals; as was noted by the Commissioner charged with inquiring into Northern Territory land 
rights before ALRA (Woodward 1974), land rights was but a fi rst tentative step to economic and social 
equality for Indigenous people.3 The recent discourse of policy failure, from both Indigenous and non-
Indigenous commentators, has focused in recent months on the issue of land rights and native title, and on 
what appears to be a pertinent policy question: why is it that restitution of land has not resulted in marked 
improvements in Indigenous socioeconomic status? This question is predicated on the following logic: the 
dispossession of Indigenous Australians from the land without agreement or treaty since 1788 has resulted 
in their socioeconomic marginalisation. Therefore, the restoration of lands since 1966 ought to have seen an 
improvement in socioeconomic status as measured by standard social indicators. 
The apparent lack of improvement in social, economic and housing conditions has led to the suggestion, 
following this logic, that an important explanation for contemporary marginality and policy failure is the 
nature of property rights. In early 2005, Hughes and Warin (2005:1) released a Centre for Independent 
Studies discussion paper that argued that the communal ownership of inalienable freehold title is important 
in explaining housing shortages and economic under-development (cf. Duncan 2003; Altman 2004). This 
view has been echoed in ‘Privatising Indigenous Land’, a discussion paper sponsored by NIC member Warren 
Mundine that received much media coverage in March 2005, but that is not yet publicly available. More 
recently in April 2005, the Prime Minister of Australia has supported the view (when visiting Wadeye in the 
Northern Territory) that land privatisation and individualisation of property rights might improve housing 
and economic development prospects for Indigenous peoples living in remote areas.4 However, at the 
National Reconciliation Planning Workshop in late May 2005 he appeared to have adjusted this position 
by suggesting that the inalienable and communal nature of Indigenous land must be maintained.5 In June 
2005, the NIC released a set of Indigenous Land Tenure Principles that sought to maintain communality and 
inalienability, while simultaneously acknowledging the possibility of compulsory leasing of such lands from 
owners to individual community residents for home ownership or business development (NIC 2005).
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In preparing this Discussion Paper we are conscious of the enormous complexity of the issues currently being 
debated: the nature of the ALRA and the limited reform of this law since 1976; the apparent intractability 
of Indigenous disadvantage in remote regions; and growing shortfalls in housing and infrastructure. So as 
not to oversimplify complexity, we make three broad observations at the outset about issues that are all too 
often overlooked in public debates.
First, is the question of property rights. Much of the current debate began with a call for the amendment 
of land rights law to allow for the sale of land held communally (by groups of traditional owners) under 
inalienable title. This call quickly changed to calls for long-term leases of land to individuals, something that 
is currently possible under the ALRA with the agreement of landowners. Communal inalienable title under 
the ALRA is a form of title that attempts to accommodate existing customary rights of ownership and use of 
land within a western legal framework. To date there seem to have been no analyses of the potential impact 
on those customary rights of intersecting proposals to individualise rights to use this land in a widespread 
fashion through long-term leases or stronger measures.
Second, as noted earlier, there is a view that since land alienation was associated with Aboriginal economic 
marginalisation, land restoration should guarantee economic incorporation. Suffi ce to say that such a view 
is at best naïve and at worst convenient. On one hand, the land returned and made available for claim is 
generally remote and is of low commercial value. On the other, residents on this land have experienced 
marginalisation and relative neglect, often for decades. Arguably, the current legacy of this—poor health, 
housing, education and employment status—is a higher order explanation for economic and social exclusion 
than the nature of land tenure. It is also generally overlooked that rights in land, as a general rule, exclude 
rights to direct control over commercially valuable mineral resources (Altman 2002). This is very different 
from the situation in other settler colonies—Canada and the USA for example—where sub-surface mineral 
rights are not distinguished from surface ownership rights. A major cause of under-development on the 
Indigenous estate is that land has been returned, but without property rights or exclusive control of 
commercially valuable resources. A comprehensive review of ALRA conducted by John Reeves examined the 
issue of the apparent failure of land rights to deliver development (Reeves 1998). However his conclusions 
and recommendations were not supported by subsequent critical examination by academic and other 
commentators (see e.g. the essays in Altman, Morphy & Rowse 1999 and the 1999 Report of the House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (Commonwealth of 
Australia 1999)).
Finally, there are features of remote Indigenous communities that make them fundamentally different from 
other Australian, and many international, economic development contexts. These communities are often in 
sparsely populated regions of Australia that are extremely distant, both geographically and culturally, from 
markets. These regions were colonised relatively late, with some parts of Arnhem Land and central Australia 
only colonised during the last 50 years. This has meant that customary (kin-based, non-market) systems 
and practices, such as wildlife harvesting and fi re management regimes, continue to be robust. Indigenous 
worldviews remain very different from those of mainstream Australia. All too often in public discourse 
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cultural difference is only paid lip service and ongoing and vibrant contestation between western and 
Indigenous views about values and legal frameworks are ignored. 
We are conscious that others will provide considered inputs to a debate that will unfold during the second 
half of 2005 (see e.g. Armstrong 2005; Central Land Council 2005). Our aims are principally to address 
some policy issues around land rights, housing and economic development in the Northern Territory. We 
aim to provide an evidence-based and dispassionate analysis; to provide our perspectives in an accessible 
manner; and to raise issues for further consideration by the Australian and Northern Territory governments, 
Indigenous organisations and those with land interests on Indigenous land.
This discussion paper is structured as follows. In section 2 a brief summary is provided, in lay terms, of 
relevant aspects of the ALRA, particularly in relation to housing and economic development on Aboriginal-
owned land.6 In sections 3 and 4 we focus attention on the issues of housing and economic development 
on Aboriginal land, addressing public policy concerns about how housing shortages might be met and how 
capital for economic development might be raised. In section 5 we provide some information about how the 
issue of fi nancing housing on communal Mãori land in nearby New Zealand has been creatively addressed.7
In the fi nal section of the paper we make some suggestions that should be considered before any policy 
reform is considered.
2. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
This section discusses the questions of who presently controls decisions about development of land held 
under the ALRA and how people or organisations obtain formal rights to use this land. Two anomalous 
features of obtaining rights to use land are mentioned: Ministerial control over decisions about land use, 
and occupation of land by state agencies. Land leased back to the state for conservation purposes under 
ALRA is not examined here.
THE NATURE OF TITLE TO ABORIGINAL LAND
The ‘Aboriginal land’ created by the ALRA is freehold title vested in statutory corporations known as land 
trusts, with some added rights to control mining. Land trusts hold land under the ALRA for the benefi t of 
Aboriginals entitled by tradition to use or occupation of the land whether or not that entitlement is qualifi ed 
by place, time, circumstance, purpose or permission. Land trust members are usually traditional owners. 
The freehold is inalienable—it cannot be sold or surrendered, except to another land trust or the Crown. 
However, lesser interests in Aboriginal land, such as leases and licences, can be granted. The law usually 
provides that someone who owns land owns ‘fi xtures’ (permanent structures) on it. This means that non-
portable housing provided by the state on Aboriginal land normally belongs to the land trust. The Northern 
Territory government cannot acquire Aboriginal land by compulsory process as it lacks the constitutional 
powers to do so; only the Commonwealth can do this.
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THE ROLE OF LAND COUNCILS AND LAND TRUSTS
There is a tripartite relationship between traditional owners, land trusts and land councils under the ALRA. 
This has the effect of balancing a number of customary imperatives about use of and responsibility for land 
with western legal accountabilities for dealings in land. The ALRA defi nes ‘traditional Aboriginal owners’ 
as people of common ancestry with ‘primary spiritual responsibility’ for defi ned tracts of land, according 
to traditional laws and customs. Unless the ALRA or some other law says so, the consent of these people is 
always required before others may use Aboriginal land. However, the ALRA recognises another important 
aspect of Aboriginal tradition: multiple, overlapping rights to different areas of land. A person can be 
traditionally entitled to use Aboriginal land for limited purposes without being a traditional Aboriginal 
owner. These limited purposes usually do not extend to building a house or conducting a business without 
the traditional Aboriginal owners’ consent. Many such people live in townships established on former 
reserve land before the ALRA was enacted, either because their ancestors were moved there by the state or 
because they were attracted there from more remote areas by the provision of services. These people must 
be consulted about development on Aboriginal land, but they cannot veto such proposals. There is a third 
category of Aboriginal people living on Aboriginal land, particularly former reserve land: those without any 
traditional entitlements to use it, also usually people whose ancestors were moved or attracted there. Like 
people with limited traditional entitlements, they are only entitled to be consulted about developments.
The role of land trusts under the ALRA are as passive land-holding entities. They are serviced by land 
councils. These are larger, regional, statutory corporations with specifi ed detailed functions under the ALRA. 
Broadly, they must represent the interests of traditional Aboriginal owners and other Aboriginal people with 
traditional interests regarding land and provide the land trusts with administrative support. If someone 
wants to use land held under the Act, the relevant land council must consult with the traditional landowners 
and affected persons as well as conduct negotiations to reach agreement for that land use. Once a proposal 
is agreed, the land council directs the land trust to enter into the transaction. Land councils must respond 
to the views of traditional Aboriginal owners and obtain their informed consent, as a collective, to any 
proposals. Traditional or agreed processes must be used to obtain consent. This is a substantial obligation 
when compared with decision-making processes for many collective endeavours in mainstream society, 
where majority voting mechanisms are the norm. It is also made more challenging, time consuming and 
costly in the many situations where a proportion of traditional owners are not resident on the land, perhaps 
for economic reasons.
Land councils’ consultation obligations are signifi cant. There are many residents of communities on Aboriginal 
land in the Northern Territory whose traditional rights to use of the land do not extend to decision-making 
about development of ALRA land. Some residents may have no traditional rights to the area in which they 
live. There are also sometimes signifi cant numbers of non-Aboriginal people in such communities. Even 
though this last group is not entitled to formal consultation under the ALRA, development issues need to be 
considered with them in mind.
6 ALTMAN, LINKHORN & CLARKE
CENTRE FOR ABORIGINAL ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH
ACCESS TO AND USE OF ABORIGINAL LAND
One cannot enter onto ALRA land to visit a community in the same way one can walk up to someone’s 
front door in the suburbs. Access to the land, even to visit communities, is restricted and largely subject to a 
permit system for people without traditional rights or who are not on government business. Beyond visiting 
or living on the land, the process of obtaining formal rights from a land trust to use land held under the 
ALRA differs according to the length of time for which rights are sought and the category of the applicant. 
In broad terms the system for obtaining rights for non-mining uses is as follows. Interests in land such as 
leases or licences can be granted by a land trust, at the direction of the land council, to state entities for 
public purposes or to any person for ‘any purpose’ for up to ten years without requiring Ministerial consent. 
The same sorts of interests can be granted to an Aboriginal person, or an Aboriginal council or association, 
for Indigenous-owned business and community purposes for up to 21 years without requiring Ministerial 
consent. Grants of interests in land for longer periods require the consent of the Minister responsible for 
the ALRA or his or her delegate where permitted. Any rents for these rights are paid to, or for the benefi t of, 
traditional Aboriginal owners.
There are further points of detail, just two of which are touched on here. Grants of interests specifi cally for 
residential purposes in favour of Aboriginal people and employees of Aboriginal groups appear to always 
require Ministerial consent; and if the right that was granted required Ministerial consent it cannot be traded 
or made subject to subsidiary grants without further consent being obtained. The further consent of the 
land council is required for any trade in granted interests. This will include, for example, a leaseholder who 
wants to mortgage their interest.8 Of course, the land council and Minister can both consent in advance to 
these further interests, as occurred with the leases for the Alice Springs to Darwin rail corridor. These powers 
to grant and consent to interests in land are subject to judicial review by the Federal Court. Additionally, the 
Minister has particular powers to override land councils and land trusts in certain circumstances.
Mineral exploration of Aboriginal land requires both the Minister’s and the land council’s consent (or that 
of the Governor-General in national interest cases).9 A detailed exploration proposal must be presented to a 
land council to be canvassed with affected Aboriginal people within a one-year period. A land council may 
only consent to the grant of an exploration licence where the traditional owners as a group agree to it and 
the land council is satisfi ed that the licence terms (which are also the subject of negotiation or failing that, 
arbitration) are reasonable. Terms and conditions of consequential mining leases are the subject of similar 
consultation and negotiation, and cooling-off periods are imposed before miners can reapply to explore an 
area of Aboriginal land. Exploration and mining agreements can provide fi nancial rewards, to be distributed 
either pursuant to the agreement or to Aboriginal people affected by the mine. 
However, the fi nancial benefi ts of mining are not limited to these negotiated monies. The ALRA maintains 
the former Aborigines Benefi ts Trust Fund as the Aboriginals Benefi t Account (ABA) (see section 4 below). 
The ALRA requires the Commonwealth to pay into the ABA monies from Consolidated Revenue equivalent to
the royalties paid to the Crown for mining on Aboriginal land in the Northern Territory. Most such royalties 
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are paid to the Crown in right of the Northern Territory as the owner of most minerals there. However, some 
are paid to the Commonwealth as the owner of in situ uranium in territories. The ABA money is distributed 
as follows: 40 per cent is statutorily required to be paid to the land councils for administration, 30 per cent 
is paid through them and royalty-receiving associations to Aboriginal people affected by mining, unspecifi ed 
proportions must be granted to Aboriginal people and used to pay the ABA’s administrative costs, and other 
amounts may be granted to the land councils to ‘top up’ their administrative budgets.
MINISTERIAL CONSENT TO DEAL IN LAND 
The degree of Ministerial power to control dealings in land under the ALRA is striking. Whether or not 
controls are warranted where mining is proposed (an issue not taken up here), they appear particularly 
paternalistic in the context of other types of land leases and licences. Justice Woodward (1974) stressed that 
the legislation resulting from his recommendations would need amendment as social conditions changed. 
It appears this is one area where, until recently, it was assumed conditions had not changed suffi ciently to 
warrant removing Ministerial powers over dealings in land. The 1998 review of the ALRA (Reeves 1998) was 
the fi rst to recommend substantial changes to land holding structures and ending the consent and approval 
role of the Minister for dealings in land. In order to promote greater independence, Reeves proposed a very 
limited review role for the Minister over major transactions referred by Indigenous-controlled entities. This 
was a signifi cant shift from Justice Woodward’s original view that Indigenous peoples’ land dealings required 
supervision by the state. That view had been only slightly adjusted in 1983, when Justice Toohey’s Seven 
Years On review resulted in the extension of thresholds for categories of dealing in land from fi ve and ten 
years to ten and twenty-one years (Toohey 1983).
It is important that avenues remain for landowners to have recourse to judicial review by the Federal Court 
of their dealings with land councils. Aside from the ultimate ability to have process scrutinised through 
litigation, we accept that some system of checks and balances is probably appropriate for a range of 
transactions. There are a number of questions to explore, however. If some layer of scrutiny over the work 
of land councils in arranging dealings in land is warranted, would it be more appropriately discharged 
by an Indigenous-controlled entity or by the state? Would it merely be an audit role to ensure process 
requirements are met in the event of a complaint, for example ensuring that informed consent was obtained 
in a timely manner from those affected? Or is there need for an active protector/regulator, additional to land 
councils, to address substantive matters such as whether a transaction is in the best interests of landowners? 
The historical record suggests that there have been few substantive disputes between land councils and 
their constituents, but as land rights moves to a more developmental phase in the post land claims era, 
the potential for such disputes increases. The point is to ensure there is an inexpensive and accessible 
protection mechanism for landowners. We would suggest that an external mechanism might be appropriate 
if it could accommodate Indigenous norms. The role of any such body might be similar to that taken by an 
ombudsman.
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An alternative protection mechanism would allow the state to withdraw from superintending actual dealings 
to a position where its role was to oversee the ALRA system as a whole. As with any statute, its ongoing 
relevance would be kept under review and policy developed from time to time to amend the law. This would 
leave landowners primarily responsible for the consequences of their decisions about land use. The essence 
would be that Parliamentary intervention be limited to medium-term policy adjustment decided on the basis 
of successes and failures in policy application rather than involving micro-management of transactions by 
the state.
Irrespective of who evaluates proposed dealings in land, there is the question of what threshold levels should 
be set in 2005 for dealings requiring any remaining degrees of supervision. The length of term of dealing, 
bearing in mind the thresholds were last extended in 1984 after the Toohey Review, needs to be reviewed. So 
too does the type of dealing—whether it should involve commercial or non-commercial terms, and whether 
it should involve just the state or, in addition, private enterprise.
Similar scrutiny could be applied to the other Ministerial roles under the ALRA. These include power to 
override decisions of land trusts and land councils and power to appoint the chairperson of the ABA.
OCCUPATION OF LAND BY STATE ENTITIES
The ALRA permits indefi nite ongoing ‘occupation’ of Aboriginal land, after it becomes Aboriginal land, by 
state agencies such as education or health without the owners’ consent. Rental is payable only where the 
continuing occupation is not for a sectional ‘community’ purpose and then only on terms set unilaterally 
by the Commonwealth Minister. At a minimum, even for a statutory occupation, one would expect to 
see a bargaining process for setting rents with a route for disputes involving mediation, arbitration and 
adjudication. Leases or licences are replacement mechanisms for these occupations under the current 
arrangements. However, landowners cannot compel the state agency occupier to move to a lease or 
terminate the occupation. And while traditional owners have historically been willing to accept peppercorn 
(nominal) or no rents in exchange for provision of much needed services, the equity of such a practice needs 
to be considered, especially as service delivery often remains sub-standard.
Again Justice Woodward (1974) provides the historical context. At the time of his report there was a consensus 
that if land were returned to Indigenous ownership it should be subject to existing rights, including prior 
interests in mineral leases, and that the new owners would be entitled to all future fees payable and the right 
to negotiate arrangements on terms acceptable to themselves. It was assumed there would be no diffi culty 
negotiating leases with state entities, missions or groups of Indigenous people. The consensus appeared to 
go further, however. In what might now be seen as an apology for the fact that many Indigenous people on 
their own country were in remote locations, Justice Woodward indicated that no rent should be charged for 
government occupation of Aboriginal land for the benefi t of local communities (schools, medical facilities 
and the like) although rents should be charged for state occupations for broader public purposes (e.g. civil 
aviation facilities). For mission occupations it was accepted that nominal rental should be paid for short-
term leases. Both mission and state occupation would include areas for staff accommodation.
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Despite expressing considerable concern about underlying transaction costs, including negotiation costs, 
the report by Reeves (1998) on the ALRA does not appear to have focused on the benefi ts foregone by land 
owners through providing state agencies with rent-free land. Justice Toohey (1983), in his review of the 
ALRA, had also seen no reason to question the initial rationale.
Thirty years on from Justice Woodward’s fi nal report, the time has probably come for this form of 
uncompensated occupation to be replaced. Existing state occupation of Aboriginal land should be regularised 
and put on a proper legal and commercial footing through the negotiation of leases. This would counter 
any perception by government agencies that there is no need to have proper tenurial and commercial bases 
for use of Aboriginal land. The case for this regularisation would be even stronger if there were moves to 
make the rights and obligations of all those who occupy townships on Aboriginal land more precise. After 
all, if the policy of governments is to expand the footprint of the mainstream economy in order to increase 
economic opportunities for Indigenous landowners, then it might be incumbent on governments to put their 
own dealings with these communities on a normal footing. This would set an example for the standards 
and behaviour expected of other economic participants who may wish to do business with Aboriginal 
landowners.
Are there grounds for maintaining distinctions between community and broader public services in the 
twenty-fi rst century? While the land is owned for the benefi t of the traditional owners, services provided 
by the state are for the benefi t of all residents, Indigenous and non-Indigenous. Traditional owners are a 
minority of residents in many larger townships on Indigenous land. It is not unusual for the state to pay for 
land use in order to deliver services. In many other circumstances the state will purchase the land it requires. 
That option is not available here because the land is inalienable. However, that does not mean the state 
should have rent-free use of land. So, while traditional owners can always maintain the prerogative not to 
charge rents, the option to do so should be clearly provided.
SHOULD THE NORTHERN TERRITORY GOVERNMENT BE PERMITTED TO ACQUIRE ABORIGINAL 
LAND COMPULSORILY?
The NIC Indigenous Land Tenure Principles propose that ‘to maximise the opportunity for individuals and 
families to acquire and exercise a personal interest in [Aboriginal land], whether for the purposes of home 
ownership or business development… a mixed system of [underlying perpetual communal] freehold and 
[overlapping transferable individual] leasehold interests’ be developed. According to the NIC, effective 
implementation of these principles requires that: 
• the consent of the traditional owners should not be unreasonably withheld for requests for individual 
leasehold interests for contemporary purposes; 
• involuntary measures should not be used except as a last resort and, in the event of any compulsory 
acquisition, strictly on the existing basis of just terms compensation (NIC 2005: 2).
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If support from traditional owners was obtained, ALRA could be amended to require that traditional owners 
not withhold consent unreasonably to leases for, say, local housing purposes. The requirement that consent 
not be unreasonably withheld in such situations could be enforced, if necessary, by a court in a civil suit 
brought by the person seeking the lease. However, it is by no means clear whether such arrangements 
would be better achieved by amending ALRA or by involuntary measures such as the intervention of the 
state (Commonwealth or Northern Territory) exercising compulsory acquisition powers. It has not been 
demonstrated that the Northern Territory government cannot achieve such acquisitions by obtaining 
traditional owners’ consent. Compulsory acquisitions in such cases would also mark another Indigenous-
specifi c departure from the general Australian practice of compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes 
only.10
3. HOUSING ON ABORIGINAL LAND
The housing tenure of Indigenous households is very different to that of the general Australian population. 
At the time of the 2001 Census, 70 per cent of all households in Australia lived in a dwelling that was either 
fully owned or mortgaged. In the Northern Territory just 14.6 per cent of Indigenous households lived in 
a fully owned or mortgaged dwelling (Table 1). The differences between the housing tenure of Indigenous 
households and the general Australian population are most pronounced for Indigenous Australians living in 
very remote areas. In outer regional areas (for instance Darwin) 34.3 per cent of households are living in fully 
owned or mortgaged dwellings. In remote areas the fi gure is 18.1 per cent, and in very remote areas it is just 
2.5 per cent. In very remote areas, 90.0 per cent of Indigenous households are in rented accommodation, as 
compared to 74.9 per cent in remote areas and 62.7 per cent in outer regional areas.11
Australia has one of the highest rates of home ownership in the OECD. Home ownership is seen as desirable 
for a number of reasons including accumulation of equity that provides fi nancial security as well as 
collateral for loans. It also provides secure and, over the longer term, more affordable housing. There have 
been suggestions that it would be desirable if Indigenous Australians in remote areas had greater levels of 
home ownership. One of the arguments for having a greater level of private home ownership and a viable 
property market is that it might result in greater private fi nancing of dwelling construction, reducing the 
need for government funding.12 Such a view, as we will demonstrate, needs further rigorous consideration. 
There is also a need for some assessment of the extent to which Aboriginal people aspire to own housing as 
a means of wealth creation.
On ALRA land the majority of dwellings are in community rental arrangements. Community rental is the 
product of a 30-year government effort in which between 500 and 1,000 dwellings per year have been built 
Australia-wide in discrete Indigenous communities at public expense, with ongoing management vested in 
Indigenous community organisations. Legally, these houses are fi xtures and therefore owned by land trusts. 
The capital provided by Commonwealth and, to a lesser extent, State and Territory government agencies 
for these dwellings has been via grants rather than loans (or debt fi nancing) and thus has not required 
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Outer Regional Remote Very remote Total
Fully owned 8.6 5.2 1.6 4.3
Being purchased 25.7 12.9 0.9 10.3
Being purchased under a 
rent/buy scheme 0.9 1.1 0.1 0.5
Rented 62.7 74.9 90.0 79.3
Being occupied rent-free 1.5 2.7 5.2 3.6
Being occupied under a 
life tenure scheme 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Other tenure type 0.5 3.0 2.2 1.9
Total Indigenous households (no.) 2,461 2,002 4,616 9,079
Table 1. Indigenous housing tenure by region (%), Northern Territory 2001
Note: Households whose housing tenure type was not stated on the census form are excluded from this table.
repayment. Dwellings have generally been built on land to which Indigenous groups already have some 
reasonably secure title. Hence this should be referred to as ‘community–owned’ housing (Sanders 2005).
The inadequacy of the housing stock in remote Indigenous communities has been thoroughly documented 
(e.g. Jones 1994; Neutze, Sanders & Jones 2000; Northern Territory Government 2004). The shortage 
of suitable housing is likely to become more acute in the next two decades given projections that the 
Indigenous population in remote areas will increase at a much faster rate than will the general Australian 
population. For example, research by Taylor (2003, 2004) and Taylor and Stanley (2005) suggests that by 2023 
the Thamarrurr region (around Wadeye/Port Keats) will experience an 88 per cent increase in population and 
have a housing shortfall of 760 houses. It is estimated that providing these houses for one small region alone 
will cost $167.2 million. 
While not just focused on Aboriginal-owned land, the most recently available research undertaken by the 
Northern Territory government (2004: 13–14) indicates that there is signifi cant unmet need in Indigenous 
housing throughout Australia, but most particularly in the Northern Territory. Taking into account 
homelessness, overcrowding and the unacceptable condition of many dwellings, this need is quantifi ed 
fi nancially at $806 million for the Northern Territory (out of a national estimate of need of $2.3 billion). On 
top of this, there are housing related infrastructure needs in the form of sewerage, water and power that 
amount to an additional $98 million in the Northern Territory (out of a national estimate of $227 million). 
It is likely that, were Taylor-like population projections made as in the Thamarrurr region, these would be 
considerable underestimates of unmet needs. Clearly the fi scal challenge is very signifi cant.
Mainstream housing models are diffi cult to transpose to these areas dominated by community rental 
because there is a limited mainstream economic base, the market value of the land is low, the capacity 
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of Indigenous people in these areas to borrow money is limited and mainstream fi nancial institutions are 
generally absent.13 The private housing market in many remote communities in the Northern Territory is 
extremely limited or non-existent. To provide some context for discussion of the feasibility of having private 
ownership of housing on ALRA land, some statistics on the income level and employment rates of Indigenous 
people in different areas of the Northern Territory are presented. According to the 2001 Census, in very 
remote areas the average individual income was just $10,216 per annum and the average household income 
was $42,748 (Table 2). The employment rate in very remote areas was 30.2 per cent. However, this includes 
CDEP employment. The mainstream employment rate is just 14.9 per cent (see Altman, Gray & Levitus 
2005: 6). Another indicator of economic stress is that in remote areas of Australia, 73 per cent of Indigenous 
adults stated that they would be unable to raise $2,000 within two weeks for an important expenditure.14
Given very low mainstream employment rates, low incomes and lack of savings among remote and very 
remote Indigenous people, commercial lenders would be unwilling to lend, or would lend only relatively 
small amounts, for housing fi nance irrespective of the nature of the land title. To illustrate this point we 
consider how much a commercial lender would be prepared to lend to a hypothetical household in which 
the adults each have the average income for very remote areas. For illustrative purposes we use a household 
consisting of four adults and fi ve children. Based on the average individual income for very remote areas 
of the Northern Territory we assume this household has a monthly income of $3,405.15 The home loan 
calculator for a major Australian bank produces a maximum amount that can be borrowed of $160,157 
over 30 years at an interest rate of 7.32 per cent. The monthly repayments are $1,109 (including a monthly 
service fee of $8). This will result in total repayments of $395,278 (i.e. total interest charge of $235,121).16
To put this into context, the current average household rent in remote areas is $192 a month. Furthermore 
the living costs assumed in home loan calculators are largely based on those in large Australian cities. In 
remote areas the living costs represented by groceries, electricity, petrol and so on are much higher than in 
major cities (Taylor 2004).17 Armstrong (2005 section 5.2) explores the attitudes of fi nancial sector experts 
to proposals that Indigenous land be individualised via leasehold or freehold titles for home loan or business 
development purposes. The responses she received indicate that conventional reasons for not advancing 
loans would likely apply to Indigenous land. Most prominent among them is that the land is not generally 
Table 2. Economic status by region of residence, Indigenous households, Northern 
Territory, 2001
Outer regional Remote Very remote All
Employment rate (%) 52.0 42.7% 30.2 36.0
Average individual income ($ p.a.) 22,268 17,040 10,216 13,460 
Average household income ($ p.a.) 43,630 39,405 42,748 42,257 
Rent ($ per week) 131 97 48 75 
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commercially valuable and that prospective borrowers will generally struggle to demonstrate that they have 
reliable income streams.
Given that the cost of building a house in a remote community is between $225,000 and $350,000 
depending upon style and location (G. Chambers [Indigenous Housing Authority of the Northern Territory], 
pers. comm., 15 June 2005), it is extremely unlikely that most Indigenous people in remote and very remote 
communities would be able to afford to build a house. Furthermore, the rate of depreciation of the housing 
stock in remote areas is very high. This results from a range of factors including the large number of people 
living in houses and resulting overcrowding, and the regular movement of people which leads to highly 
variable residential composition.18 Current housing designs do not accommodate the culturally distinct ways 
in which houses are often used in remote communities, and they are often not suited to the climate. Finally, 
there are diffi culties in getting access to tradespeople for maintenance.
The other major issue is that ALRA land would, in general, sell for a low price if it could be freely traded 
because of the remoteness of communities and the low commercial value of the land. Since ALRA land 
cannot be traded in the market, current prices are not available. An indication of possible values is provided 
by the average price paid for land acquired by the Indigenous Land Corporation in the Northern Territory, 
that is $13 per hectare. This land was primarily pastoral leasehold and so could have a higher economic value 
than much of the land held under the ALRA, particularly in the arid zone.
Another indicator of the possible value of the land and the depth of the property market can be obtained 
from house sales in some of the smaller and more remote townships of the Northern Territory (not on ALRA 
or native title land). The average unimproved capital values for houses sold in the fi nancial year 2004–05 
in three locations considered ranged from $5 per square metre in Tennant Creek to $25 per square metre in 
Pine Creek and $36 per square metre in Katherine (Table 3).
Location Population 
**
Distance 
from 
Darwin 
(km)
No. of 
sales 
2004-5**
Median 
Block 
Area 
(sq m*)
Median Land 
Value ($) 
(Unimproved 
Capital 
Value)*
Median 
Sale 
Price* 
($)
Median 
Unimproved 
Capital Value/
Area* ($)
Pine Creek 619 248 13 800 20,000 43,000 25.00 
Elliott* 419 850 7 1,390 6,000 15,000 4.32 
Tennant Creek 3,286 1,000 71 1,000 5,100 78,000 5.00 
Katherine 6,719 317 123 948 34,000 157,000 36.00 
Table 3. Details of property sales in selected remote townships, Northern Territory, 2004–05
Sources: * Australian Valuer-General Northern Territory, pers. comm., 10 June 2005.
** 2001 Census. For Elliott data for the period 2003 to 2005 is used because of the small number of sales per year.
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A clear message from the above analysis is that, unless income levels increase dramatically in remote 
Indigenous communities, a push to private ownership will not result in private fi nancing of the construction 
of a signifi cant number of new dwellings. This is primarily because the cost of constructing housing is 
far higher than the likely value of the land, even if individuated and privatised. Hence land would be of 
insuffi cient value to use as mortgage collateral even if the commercial banking sector was disposed to 
provide loans on Indigenous leasehold land.
The real policy challenge over the next few decades is how to pay for the housing requirements of remote 
Indigenous communities on, and off, Indigenous land. The discussion above demonstrates why we think 
it is unlikely that private fi nancing by individuals (or community organisations) will result in substantial 
numbers of new dwellings being constructed, unless there are substantial increases in the incomes of 
Indigenous people in remote communities. However, it has to be acknowledged that there would be a 
relatively small number of Indigenous people who, if they were granted secure rights in land acceptable 
to lending institutions (a licence to occupy or a long-term lease), would have suffi cient incomes to borrow 
money in order to purchase, renovate or construct a house if they so desired. Given this situation, Indigenous 
communities and governments will need to think innovatively and hard about alternative models. 
One possibility is for governments (Territory or Australian) to continue to fund the construction and 
maintenance of the required houses. This could occur through constructing publicly-owned housing stock 
on land leased from traditional Aboriginal landowners for this purpose. 
Another possibility is for governments to arrange for the construction of dwellings and then transfer 
ownership to Indigenous organisations representing landowners. Landowners might in turn lease these 
assets as a whole to a trading subsidiary that has the day-to-day operational responsibility for tenanting 
and maintaining the dwellings. Loans, grants or a mixture of both could fund this approach. Alternatively, 
the trading organisation might take a lease of land and take full responsibility for all housing constructed on 
it. This though has potential pitfalls, as demonstrated in north Queensland with Katter leases where housing 
stock in poor condition was transferred to individuals on perpetual leases without suffi cient consideration 
of funding maintenance, repairs or replacement dwellings (see Moran et al. 2002 and the similar example 
from Minginui, New Zealand, below). 
A further variant is for governments to provide or facilitate funding to Indigenous organisations to construct 
and manage dwellings, as occurred in the 1970s with Aboriginal Housing Associations (see Sanders 2000). 
Such a project could be undertaken in partnership with an aid organisation like Habitat for Humanity (see 
section 5 on New Zealand). Again, the funding might be a mix of grants and loans. Facilitated loan funding 
might come from private-sector fi nancial institutions to the housing entity. This could provide opportunity 
for landowners’ housing organisations to form meaningful relationships with fi nancial institutions. At 
the household level, community residents might enter renewed housing relationships with these housing 
organisations rather than transact directly with the ultimate source of the fi nance. This might be one way 
of addressing concerns about how Indigenous people might offer adequate security for borrowings. If 
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the landowners’ housing organisation has a lease of the land it might pledge this as security. It should be 
noted these possibilities are not certain to attract support from lending institutions given likely practical 
limitations on recovery methods for defaulted loans. In the USA, government guarantees have a place in the 
architecture of lending for housing development on Indigenous land. Their appropriateness to Australian 
conditions remains to be explored. There is also the issue of whether rent collected by the housing entity 
would be suffi cient to service any loans.
Assuming appropriate governance of a local housing entity and access to appropriate expertise, an 
advantage of households entering housing relationships with a local organisation representing landowners 
is that local circumstances might be more readily accommodated. Many residents might be tenants of such 
an organisation. However, others may be in a position to purchase a dwelling. Their contractual relationship 
would be with the local organisation. A variation of a rent-to-buy scheme, that takes account of the 
accumulating equity stake the borrower has in the asset, might be appropriate. The borrowers would require 
occupancy rights over their dwelling and this could be obtained through a licence to occupy or a sub-lease. 
In the event of any default the obligations would be owed to an organisation representing the landowners 
rather than an outside entity, avoiding the possible problem of outsiders taking control of inalienable 
Indigenous land. Defaulters might revert to a temporary or permanent rental relationship, with appropriate 
protection of their accumulated equity stake.
The question of who would purchase such an interest in a dwelling is important. It may be an unrealistic goal 
for many people for some time to come and not just because of income levels. Some mainstream borrowers 
are required to have life insurance to cover their mortgage obligations. Actuarial measures and demographic 
indicators might make this an unrealistically expensive option for would-be borrowers where the term 
of a loan might exceed the borrower’s life expectancy, given the lower than average life-expectancy of 
Indigenous people.19 It might also be important to explore whether the borrowers might more appropriately 
be members of a (close) family group involving, say, two generations rather than an individual or couple, 
so that the borrowing group obtains as much fl exibility as possible in meeting its debt obligations in light 
of changing employment and other life circumstances. Intuitively, it seems that, in the short term at least, 
local housing organisations might have more chance of tailoring loans to these lifestyle considerations than 
would mainstream fi nancial institutions.
In a pure public funding model governments would meet maintenance expenses from rents, but this cannot 
be assumed for the mixed or private models. Quantitative modelling work on different funding options is 
not currently available to better inform policy makers of the fi nancial viability of the alternatives to publicly 
funded housing stock. The question is whether housing costs can be lowered or incomes raised suffi ciently to 
put the housing needs of these communities on a sustainable footing. By sustainable we mean that a housing 
organisation’s income from all sources covers the replacement costs of the housing stock it is responsible for. 
If a sustainable future can be planned, this might make one-off costs associated with transition from the 
current arrangements more palatable for governments. However, given the levels of employment and income 
in the short to medium term (and possibly the long term) it is hard to envisage a situation, whatever model 
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is used, that does not require substantial levels of government funding. It is unlikely, in our view, that the 
current rents would be suffi cient to fund more than a modest proportion of the costs of the construction of 
replacement dwellings. The current levels of rents being collected (an average of $48 per week per household 
in remote areas of the Northern Territory) are low by Australian standards. However, this may be a fair level 
of rental given the low quality of much of the housing stock (Northern Territory Government 2004). Looking 
forward, and with hopes for better quality and more appropriate dwellings, it will be important to explore 
carefully how much rent households can afford to pay.20
This discussion of possible future options has not addressed in any detail what should be done to clarify 
rights and obligations over current housing stock. On Indigenous land in remote Northern Territory 
communities there may be many buildings that were constructed since the land was returned to Indigenous 
ownership and that were paid for with government money without a licence to occupy or lease of land 
fi rst being obtained, the occupation of which does not constitute an ongoing occupation by a state agency. 
Complex legal issues would arise should there be disputes about the use of such buildings. There is a level of 
uncertainty, and in some cases current occupants of buildings (particularly state agencies which have never 
sought a lease or licence) may fi nd they have no right of occupancy.
4. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
This section addresses three key issues. First, Indigenous Australians have the right to defi ne their own 
economic development objectives and to be cautious in adapting ideas from elsewhere for use in their lives 
and on their land. Second, there are many structural barriers to undertaking economic development on ALRA 
land that are of greater relevance than the challenges posed by the fact that the land is communally owned. 
Changing the ALRA will not bring the land closer to the markets, nor will it change its use profi le. This leads 
to the third issue: although access to capital for economic development could be improved, the extent of 
present shortfalls is not a fi rst-order critical issue, given the other challenges. However, existing sources of 
funds could be used more innovatively to allow Indigenous people greater opportunity to fi nance existing 
economic development options.
THE IMPORTANCE OF INDIGENOUS VIEWS ABOUT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
A perspective that has some infl uence in current policy debates is that Indigenous people do, or should, 
aspire to ‘mainstream’ economic development. In reality, Indigenous people in remote areas of Australia have 
diverse aspirations and views about economic development for themselves, their families and communities. 
These range from a desire for full engagement with the mainstream market, for example in full-time jobs, to 
signifi cant engagement in the customary sector, as in the harvesting of wildlife (Altman 2004; Rowse 2002). 
Despite the fact that there are often substantial differences between the aspirations of Indigenous people 
in remote communities and those of the majority of Australians, with a few notable exceptions Indigenous 
views about economic development receive relatively little attention in national policy debates. Indigenous 
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aspirations in remote communities regularly involve a smaller role for the market and a bigger role for the 
customary economy (something which is almost non-existent for non-Indigenous people in many areas 
of Australia) and by default a greater role for income support payments (including from the Community 
Development Employment Program (CDEP)). The extent to which Indigenous people living on Indigenous 
land should pursue mainstream economic development objectives is a contested matter. It is important that 
Indigenous views and aspirations, especially from very remote regions, are heard and taken seriously by those 
interested in Indigenous economic development.
LAND TITLE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
A widely accepted position among economists about relationships between land tenure, economic 
development and environmental sustainability is that secure, individualised land tenure is essential (e.g. 
Demetz 1967; Duncan 2003). Duncan (2003) and Hughes and Warin (2005) have argued specifi cally that 
secure, individualised tenure is important if rates of economic development on Indigenous-owned land in 
Australia are to be maximised.
Duncan (2003: 314) provides the following defi nition of secure, individualised tenure:
individuals hold the rights to use the land for whatever purposes they wish, except for illegal activities 
and activities that attenuate the rights held by others … The title may be freehold or it may be leasehold; 
but to give leaseholders the incentive to develop the land to its full potential the lease should be 
suffi ciently long.
Duncan (2003: 314) identifi es three important theoretical consequences of having such property rights:
• individuals who have secure property rights over land will be more likely to take care of it since they 
will be keen to see it increase in value in order to generate a higher future income stream;
• loans for investment and consumption purposes can be raised by mortgaging the land; and
• the holder of the right to the land knows that they will be able to receive the benefi t of any 
investments they make in the land.
The idea that only individual title, rather than communal title, maximises economic development on 
Indigenous land in Australia is not necessarily valid just because existing rates of development on ALRA land 
are considered unsatisfactory. However, it should not be overlooked that, in the Northern Territory, much 
large scale economic development, such as long-life mines and major projects like railways, already occur to 
a greater degree on Aboriginal land than off it. And the blanket assumption that what works in urban and 
regional Australia can be readily transported to remote Indigenous Australia needs to be carefully considered 
on an empirical basis, case by case. Conversely, closer examination of both the nature of land and resources 
available and the social structure and commercial capacities of land-owning groups would provide more 
realistic information about production possibilities and comparative advantage—the very remoteness of 
much Aboriginal land limits its capacity for conventional economic development.
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With these provisos in mind, it is still worth examining Duncan’s theoretical consequences. It appears that 
the fi rst and third ‘benefi t’ of having secure, individualised property rights are also achievable in the context 
of communal property rights vested in traditional owners of ALRA land. The fact that there is communal 
ownership of land does not lead to unconstrained use of the resource and the associated ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ (Ostrom 2003), that is, resource depletion. Indeed there is growing evidence that the Indigenous 
estate in remote regions is amongst the most environmentally intact in Australia (Altman 2003; Australian 
State of the Environment Committee 2001). Balanced analysis of the costs of communal land ownership 
needs to consider the costs of environmental damage associated with private land ownership and commercial 
pressures (see Quiggin 2001 with respect to the Murray–Darling Basin). And there is ample evidence that 
the cost of repairing environmental damage is several factors higher than the cost of prevention. There is 
a growing view that communal ownership of land and inalienability is associated with intergenerational 
sustainability (Altman & Whitehead 2003; Whitehead, Russell-Smith & Woinarski 2005).
The situation of townships on remote ALRA lands is more complex. This is due in no small part to the 
ill-defi ned rights and responsibilities over township assets of landowners, state entities and residents, as 
highlighted in the preceding two sections. Again, these problems do not mandate individualising rights to 
land as the most appropriate solution.
In terms of certainty of receiving any benefi ts from investments made in the land, rights holders in ALRA land 
should receive them. The key thing to recognise is that acting as a group who (by kinship) are involuntarily 
in association is a more complex undertaking than acting singly or in voluntary association with others (e.g. 
through associations, partnerships and companies). While it remains a cultural imperative to act collectively 
in much economic endeavour, less value will be placed in such kin-based societies on individuals ‘striking 
out’ from the group for personal business ventures. Of course such activities are not prohibited, but where 
a person wants to make use of communal property for individual business purposes they will have to obtain 
the informed consent of the group. But the complexity of working in a group does not make such activity 
invalid. Indeed, since communal decision-making is the culturally legitimate form of decision-making, 
compliance adds a degree of certainty to any agreements made.
In a communal decision-making process, benefi ts will usually be distributed among owners according to 
their own systems. Initiatives to encourage individual incentive to drive the establishment of a business, take 
full responsibility and put in the long-term effort required to establish and make a business profi table can 
work with, rather than just ignore, these sociocultural dynamics.
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It is worth recalling the benefi ts of owning ALRA land. The property rights that Indigenous people have in 
land can generate an economic return in a number of ways. 
• The right to harvest resources allows people to hunt and gather for personal consumption (non-market 
production). This generates economic and health benefi ts. Altman (1987, 2003) has documented the 
continuing signifi cance of the customary economy in Arnhem Land in imputed income terms, while 
more recently Burgess et al. (2005) have summarised the social health benefi ts of living on country.
• The right to harvest resources means that businesses can be set up which sell produce such as bush 
foods from the customary sector in local and regional markets, especially when commercial licences 
for live species sales (e.g. crocodile hatchlings) are concurrently procured.
• The right to exclude others from the land means that a fee can be charged to allow entry onto 
Aboriginal-owned land for recreational purposes. This currently occurs through systems of permits 
which are required by non-community members to enter Aboriginal land for a range of purposes 
including recreation, tourism, fi shing, etc.
• Land can be leased to third parties for a range of purposes such as tourism, safari hunting and 
recreational fi shing lodges and infrastructure.
• The need to obtain traditional owner consent to mineral exploration means that this lever can be 
used to negotiate payments in return for mining that supplement the transfer of mining royalty 
equivalents to the ABA, as well as for employment and business contracts at mine sites.
Indigenous people on ALRA land are already generating economic benefi ts from their property rights over 
their land in all of these ways. The use and ‘sale’ of a number of these rights can be used to raise fi nance, 
which in turn can be applied to a range of purposes including consumption and investment. The central 
question is whether communal ownership is the key to limits on the economic return that landowners 
obtain. Further, if economic returns are limited by communal ownership, it is necessary to assess the order 
of magnitude in increases in economic returns if individualisation of tenure were to occur. Potential social 
and environmental costs also need to be taken into account. These are diffi cult questions to address, and the 
answers are not self-evidently in favour of individualisation.
COMMERCIAL LOANS AND LAND
So what of Duncan’s second benefi t, loans via mortgaging the land? There is certainly some validity to the 
argument that communal ownership will make it more diffi cult for Indigenous people to obtain fi nance for 
business purposes from institutions focused mainly on doing business with the ‘individualised economy’. 
Communal ownership of land has not prevented Indigenous people borrowing money. But while the property 
rights held by Indigenous people in their ALRA land can be used to raise capital, undertake joint ventures and 
achieve economic benefi t in a number of ways, the legal and traditional customary processes required can 
be very complex and time consuming. They can also be more costly for both owners and business partners 
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than if dealing with a single owner (or holder of the property right). This complexity might mean that the 
nature of investments made is different from elsewhere. These processes should be examined periodically to 
see whether change is warranted. For example, we suggested in section 2 above that the Minister’s consent 
role is a complicating factor that is no longer justifi able. 
Investors may also take the view that business prospects are simply brighter elsewhere because resolving 
any subsequent disagreements about the operation of a venture may be more diffi cult and costly, even 
though the group of owners is represented by its agent, the land council. There are many other investment 
opportunities available within and beyond Australia that are based on individualised rights that are well 
understood by prospective investors. 
This is likely to reduce the number of people willing to undertake major investments on ALRA land, either 
as a joint venture or a sole investor. It may also mean that some business opportunities which would be 
profi table by conventional commercial criteria on individually owned land will not be considered on ALRA 
land. Finally it may skew the type of investment towards large-scale high-value low-risk investments or, for 
higher risk investments, higher returns to reward the greater risk taken (for a further discussion of these 
issues, see Altman & Dillon 2005). Such a pattern of investment is also likely to be in part a result of the 
nature of the investment opportunities in the context of low population density, low average income and 
the low agricultural value of the land. There is some evidence that this is indeed the pattern of investment 
that is occurring, with a relatively large number of mines being established on Aboriginal land and the 
leasing of land for the building of the Alice Springs to Darwin Railway. 
Communal ownership undoubtedly infl uences the nature of economic activity on ALRA land. However, as 
we have noted, there are features of ALRA land, of remote Indigenous communities, and of the economic 
activities they undertake that make them fundamentally different from other Australian and many 
international, economic development contexts. These activities and distinctive features are probably more 
important for the analysis of economic development prospects, at least in the short to medium term, than 
the fact that the land is communally owned. It should also be acknowledged that low levels of education, 
poor health and relatively high rates of substance abuse in remote communities limit economic development 
prospects—these problems need to be addressed before development, however defi ned, can be enhanced. 
In short, there are many barriers, other than communal ownership of land, to Indigenous economic 
development prospects. 
Environmental issues are clearly crucial from a national perspective. Indigenous participation in the 
customary sector and in natural and cultural resource management on the Indigenous estate is generating 
considerable benefi ts for particular regions and the nation as a whole in biodiversity conservation, fi re 
abatement and in control of weeds and feral animals (see Altman 2003; Altman & Cochrane 2005; Altman 
& Whitehead 2003; Northern Land Council 2004; Whitehead, Russell-Smith & Woinarski 2005). Indigenous 
people are participating in bio-security, coastal surveillance, land and sea management activities (Northern 
Land Council 2004). There is a business case for government support of these activities. It has been estimated 
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that expenditure on natural resource management in Kakadu National Park is far higher than in adjacent 
Arnhem Land, and this might represent a signifi cant under-investment in Aboriginal land management. 
Equitable investment in natural resource management is one way in which employment can be generated 
and regional development stimulated (Altman & Dillon 2005). The same case can be made with respect to 
Indigenous sea rangers, coastal fi sheries protection, and coastal surveillance.
While signifi cant investment on Aboriginal-owned land might be diffi cult to attract, it is ironic that 
‘Indigenous’ interests currently hold signifi cant amounts of capital that could be more actively utilised 
to stimulate economic development. These include holdings by Indigenous Business Australia and the 
Indigenous Land Corporation for Australia-wide use, and by the ABA for use in the Northern Territory only 
(Altman 2002). While space precludes a full analysis here of all Indigenous fi nancial assets, the ABA is a 
signifi cant source of potential capital and/or collateral for borrowings. It warrants closer analysis, because it 
could generate fi nance for Indigenous development predicated on land rights.
THE ABA AS A SOURCE OF CAPITAL
The Offi ce of Indigenous Policy Coordination currently administers the ABA. The net accumulated assets of 
the ABA of an estimated $100 million are ultimately controlled by the Minister for Immigration, Multicultural 
and Indigenous Affairs. 
The payment of mining royalty equivalents (MREs) to the ABA engenders an ongoing debate. From an 
Aboriginal perspective, they are Aboriginal moneys generated by mining activity on Aboriginal-owned land. 
From a bureaucratic perspective they are public moneys because they are paid from consolidated revenue. 
There is a clear tension between these two perspectives. Aboriginal people want control of the ABA and have 
clearly stated this since a review of the Aboriginals Benefi t Trust Account in 1984 (Altman 1984).
The philosophical underpinning for paying MREs is clear—Justice Woodward in 1974 (and Paul Hasluck 
before him in 1952, see Altman 1983) believed that mining royalties raised on Aboriginal land should 
constitute resources with which Aboriginal people can commit to economic advancement. However, these 
resources should also be used in a manner consistent with forms of economic development chosen by 
Aboriginal people themselves, independent of government controls and bureaucratic strictures. There is 
no reason to assume that these underpinnings have lost their validity. Practically, however, the control of 
dispersal of ABA funds has increasingly come under Ministerial control. 
Of particular concern is the decision that the equity of the ABA be maintained at an arbitrary minimum of 
$46 million as a buffer to guard against falls in revenue. This decision is based on a fi nding by the Auditor-
General in 2003 that ‘[t]he outlook for natural resource development in the Northern Territory is neither 
certain, nor strong, leading to uncertainty with regard to royalty equivalents’ (cited in ABA 2003: 19). In 
2005 this fi nding would seem to be at odds with the strong performance of the mining sector and the 
high number of exploration agreements on Aboriginal land over the last few years (ABA 2002, 2003, 2004). 
Similarly, the ABA has maintained consistent incomes of over $50 million per annum since 2002. Further to 
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this, payments to or for the benefi t of Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory were set at only $5 million 
per year in 2002–03 and 2003–04, and even these payments were subject to the approval of the Minister on 
advice of the ABA advisory committee. In addition, in 2003 the Minister also wrote to land councils advising 
that, following a thorough investigation of the issues, ‘he is of the view that he does have the power to make 
grants with conditions’ (ABA 2003: 11). The realities of this were evident during the 2004 election campaign, 
when the Federal government proposed accessing the ABA to fund election promises made in the Northern 
Territory (Liberal Party of Australia 2004).
When examining the breakdown of payments under the different sections of the ABA it is evident that grants 
earmarked to or for the benefi t of Aboriginals living in the Northern Territory are extremely low (averaging 
well below $5 million per annum) when considered against a $100 million accumulated surplus. Also, it 
becomes evident that signifi cant amounts of the ABA’s income are allocated to meet its own administrative 
expenses, a practice that only began in the late 1990s. The relationship between direct grants and the cost 
of administering them seems extraordinarily high (see ABA 2002, 2003, 2004). Put plainly, administrative 
expenses have run at over 100 per cent of distributions in some years.
In terms of economic development, the status of the ABA raises a number of important issues. Is it 
appropriate that in 2005 the Minister has fi nal approval over the expenditure of monies derived from 
Indigenous land that are specifi cally designated to be spent for the benefi t of Aboriginal people? How might 
alternative or Indigenous views of development be given credence under such an arrangement? Could the 
ABA’s asset base of around $100 million be better utilised to raise capital or to underwrite borrowings for 
Indigenous communities for immediate needs such as enterprise development, infrastructure or customary 
land management? Is making the current payments to and through Land Councils enabling maximum 
benefi ts for Indigenous communities?
While the ABA represents one possibility for stimulating economic development in remote communities, it 
will not necessarily provide all the capital that Indigenous development might require. The complexities of 
Indigenous circumstances, competing concepts of how or for whom economic development occurs, and the 
legacy of entrenched disadvantage all mean additional sources will be needed. Of paramount importance 
in the current policy debate is that a diversity of Indigenous perspectives on economic development be 
heard and all possible avenues for appropriate and sustainable development on Aboriginal land be explored, 
lest the mistakes of the past be repeated. Equally, Indigenous interests and capital holdings must be better 
aligned and more independent of government control in order to maximise capacity to stimulate economic 
development in ways amenable to Indigenous aspirations in all their diversity.
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5. NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE OF HOUSING ON COMMUNAL LAND OWNED 
BY MÃORI
Mechanisms used in New Zealand for housing on Mãori-owned communal land offer both possibilities and 
warnings for an Australian audience. The warnings relate to consequences of individualising land interests 
such as fragmentation of land and ownership rights through succession and partition. The possibilities relate 
to state lending to assist with house fi nance, cooperative endeavours to lower housing costs to communities, 
and separating out occupation rights for housing purposes from title to the land.
MÃORI LAND
The communal ‘Mãori land’ discussed here is the statutory category of Mãori freehold land.21 Mãori freehold 
land is held and managed under Te Ture Whenua Mãori/Mãori Land Act 1993 (‘the 1993 Act’).22 From 1865, 
ownership of the majority of Mãori land has been determined over time by the Mãori Land Court. Land 
blocks were brought before the Court, or an equivalent title investigation process, to determine who had 
ownership rights. In simple terms, the group of confi rmed owners was awarded a title to enable them to deal 
with the land. Ownership is divided by shareholdings or held in common. In this sense, most Mãori land, even 
where it has multiple owners, has already been individualised.
This title determination process has attracted much criticism. It is now generally accepted that until 
recently the system was underweight on Mãori legal norms about community rights in land, and overweight 
on granting rights to individuals to divide and deal with their interests separately from the remaining 
community of owners. Many commentators consider that enabling Mãori to deal in individual interests 
in land without reference to the community of owners undermined the customary bases for Mãori land 
tenure—which included group rights and group decision-making—and that this contributed to excessive 
sales of Mãori land to outsiders in a way that was injurious to the long-term interests of those communities 
(e.g. Ward 1999). There is now greater emphasis on retention of Mãori land for the benefi t of its owners and 
tribal communities.
Of the land retained in Mãori ownership, succession over time to the legal interests of deceased owners 
has led to proliferation of owners for many blocks.23 Along with the swelling of ownership lists, the sheer 
number of land parcels also grew through the subdivision of Mãori land. While this refl ected communities of 
owners splitting their land interests, it also led in many cases to uneconomic land holdings.
Proliferation of owners and excessive subdivision has more recently led to moves to encourage extended 
family groups and tribal groups to vest individual land holdings in trustees for the benefi t of the group. This 
lowers administrative costs and avoids the need for individual successions.
Despite the availability of these remedies the administrative state of Mãori land titles continues to hinder 
utilisation and development by many landowners. Mãori land today comprises about 1.5 million hectares 
or 6 per cent of New Zealand’s total land area. However, the ownership of that land is divided into more 
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than 2.3 million interests. This is said to be comparable to the total number of ownership interests for the 
remaining 94 per cent of New Zealand’s land area. The number of owners for blocks varies, with 10 per cent 
of blocks being vested in a single owner (possibly representative) through to 10 per cent with an average of 
425 owners each. The overall average is 62 owners per title (New Zealand Controller and Auditor-General 
2004).
With this background as context we can move to describe a range of situations encountered by people 
establishing or renewing housing on Mãori land.
FINANCE AND SECURITY
Having suffi cient regular income to be able to repay a loan is a key issue affecting many who want to occupy 
multiply-owned Mãori land for housing purposes. State-owned lending institutions provide housing loans to 
low-income earners who can demonstrate ability to repay the loan.24
Housing New Zealand Corporation (HNZC) lending for housing on multiply-owned Mãori land is secured 
against the building rather than the land. A 15 per cent deposit is required. Such loans are available for 
houses that will be placed near road access in the mainland North or South Islands. This requirement is so 
that the house can be removed as a fi nal measure in the event of loan default. It is a requirement that the 
house be easily relocatable (in general these are single storey pile foundation homes).
HNZC also has a low-deposit (3%) loan programme for low and modest income earners wanting to buy or 
build in rural and regional areas. This low deposit scheme connects with a self-build program, targeted at 
Mãori, called Kapa Hanga Kainga - Group Self Build. This is for people who want to build their homes as part 
of an extended family (whãnau) group. Grants to help with architects and other project management costs 
are available under this scheme.25
RIGHTS TO USE LAND FOR HOUSING
Land used for housing might be owned by a narrow or wider group of owners. An extended family group that 
owns a parcel of Mãori land outright, is prepared to operate as a single economic unit for housing purposes, 
and wishes to build or renovate a house or houses on the land is an example of the former. Assuming the 
owners have the means to repay a loan, the land could be mortgaged to a lender prepared to make loans 
against Mãori freehold land.26
The situation becomes more complex where ownership is more widely held and only some of the owners live 
on the land. Others may live in regional or urban centres to access work and recreational opportunities. The 
land may be incapable of housing all owners because of size or topographical limits. Broadly, owners of land 
in this category have at least three options: partition, leases or occupation orders.
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The Mãori Land Court can order the partition of Mãori freehold land to provide an owner with a dwelling 
site, although this is not encouraged. The test for any partition is that the Court must be satisfi ed the 
partition is necessary for the effective operation, development and utilisation of the land.
Owners may lease the whole or a portion of a block to some of their number for housing purposes. The 
lease may or may not be on market rental terms. Where the land is Mãori freehold land and the lease is for 
three years or longer the Registrar of the Mãori Land Court must note the lease under the 1993 Act. Long-
term leases of more than 52 years (including renewals) require agreement from half the owners (undivided 
interests where the land is held in common) or 50 per cent of the shareholders (defi ned interests) as well as 
approval from the Mãori Land Court.
The Mãori Land Court may make occupation orders in favour of owners of land for a set term or to terminate 
on an event, such as death. Orders may also be made in favour of persons entitled to succeed as owners to 
the land. An occupation order entitles a landowner to exclusive use of part or all of the land as a dwelling 
site. A number of orders may be made for different areas in one land title. Before making an occupation order 
the Mãori Land Court must have regard to the best overall use and development of the land, the effect of 
the proposal on the owners’ interests, and the opinions of the owners as a whole. The Court must be satisfi ed 
that the owners have had suffi cient notice of the proposal and time to discuss it; that there is a suffi cient 
degree of support from the owners; that the owners understand the interest may pass by succession; and 
that the applicant’s interest in the block is suffi cient to justify an occupation order.
Under this arrangement, the community of owners remains intact and there is no further fragmentation of 
land titles as no partition takes place. No survey is required. The applicant provides the court with a sketch 
plan of the proposed house site or an existing dwelling.
The occupier will be liable for local authority rates for the area of the parent block occupied. The occupier 
will also have to meet other costs such as establishing any connections to power and telephone. Rental 
money may or may not be payable by the occupant to the owners, either once or periodically for the right 
to occupy the land. The terms of the order will address whether ownership of the building will pass to the 
landowners at the conclusion of the occupation order, with or without compensation being payable to the 
holder of the order or their estate.
If Mãori freehold land is vested in trustees or is owned by a Mãori Incorporation the consent of the trustees 
or committee of management must be obtained for any application for an occupation order. Additionally, 
the terms of trust may authorise the trustees to grant directly licences to benefi ciaries to occupy portions 
of the land for a dwelling. Such a licence is negotiated between the trustees and the applicant and is noted 
by the Registrar of the Mãori Land Court. Such a licence to occupy has the same effect as an occupation 
order.
Two examples are given here to illustrate practical challenges connected with providing housing on Mãori 
land.
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TORERE: AN EXAMPLE OF A PARTNERSHIP 
Habitat for Humanity is an NGO founded in 1976 to eliminate poverty in housing throughout the world. 
As an organisation, it works in partnership with local communities to address housing problems. It claims 
to complete a new home somewhere in the world every 26 minutes. Its New Zealand operations are with a 
range of communities, including Mãori tribal groups.27
In 1999 the Ngãi Tai iwi (tribe) formed a partnership with Habitat for Humanity to eradicate substandard 
housing on land owned by tribal members at Torere in the Eastern Bay of Plenty region of the North Island 
of New Zealand. It is known as Te Hinahina o Te Rangimarie Housing Project. Habitat treated this as a pilot 
project for attracting government funding to joint venture with iwi around New Zealand. 
The core problem to address was that 20 families were living in sub-standard housing. Ngai Tai and Habitat 
presented a proposal to government that would see housing funded by split contributions from the iwi
($10,000 per house), Habitat ($20,000 per house) and the State ($40,000 per house). In 2000 the New 
Zealand government agreed to provide an interest free loan of up to $800,000 in support of the project, 
through HNZC.
Between September 2000 and October 2003, 21 houses were built to house more than 55 iwi members. House 
recipients contributed 500 hours of sweat equity in labour towards their own and other families’ houses. 
Under the system the occupying family purchases the house through a no-interest, no profi t mortgage. 
Using the skills obtained from the project the tribe can continue to build homes for its members.
MINGINUI: AN EXAMPLE OF A TRIBAL VILLAGE 
Minginui is a former state-forestry village in the tribal area of Ngãti Whare. It is remote by New Zealand 
standards, being located in an inland valley away from major roads. It is surrounded by commercial 
plantation and indigenous protection forest. By 1987 the state was no longer interested in owning this 
village as a result of structural economic reforms that began in 1984. At this point the village comprised a 
number of houses on fenced allotments and community infrastructure. All the land was owned by the state 
and administered by the New Zealand Forest Service. Private owners of a mill near the village, Carter Holt 
Harvey, owned a number of the houses on parts of the land that were leased from the state.
The government decided to return ownership of the whole village to Ngãti Whare at no cost. This was 
achieved by 1988. By this point the 38 houses and accompanying leases owned by Carter Holt Harvey had 
been transferred to their occupiers as part of a redundancy package when the mill closed as part of the 
economic restructuring then occurring. 
By agreeing to take ownership of the village, Ngãti Whare were committing to a situation requiring 
signifi cant reinvestment to protect and grow this asset base. By the time of the hand back the Forest Service 
village assets were not well maintained. This bears some similarities to the Katter lease system mentioned 
earlier. Both the sewerage and water systems were at the end of their useful economic lives. An August 
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1987 study rated 50 of 84 houses surveyed as substandard.28 The local municipal authority had earlier itself 
refused to take responsibility for the village unless the infrastructure was fi rst repaired.
The Crown returned the land to the tribe in one title. Title was vested by the Mãori Land Court in an ancestor 
of the iwi in trust.29 The trustee administrators leased the land to a trading company. The trading company 
operates the village.
Around the time of the return around 94 per cent of villagers were of Mãori descent. About 80 per cent 
identifi ed as tangata whenua (people belonging to the traditional tribal groups of that area). The villagers 
then comprised mostly skilled forestry workers and their families. At this point there was very little regular 
work available. Most villagers were made redundant by the economic restructuring process between 1984 
and 1987. 
Occupants of houses had a new landlord after the return, the trading/administrative arm of the Ngãti Whare 
tribe. It was intended the tribal trust would sell the house buildings to their occupants to generate capital 
to fund infrastructure needs in addition to the modest weekly levy occupiers pay to run the village. Over 
time, the occupants’ rights were formalised by the sale of houses and granting of occupation licences for 
the house plots by the tribal administrators. The levy paid by occupants is the annual income source for 
maintaining the village.
The community numbers around 200 people now, down from an estimated 500 in its vibrant heyday as a 
timber village. Unemployment remains entrenched given the isolation of residents from work opportunities. 
Alternatives such as art or eco-tourism have yet to become established.
Overall, the evaluation from a study of this village (Hutton 2004) is that despite good faith and good 
intentions the administration of the village has been beset by a lack of capacity and money to operate such 
an asset. Basic repairs to houses have been fi nanced privately or through HNZC’s rural fi nancing programmes. 
The infrastructure continues to deteriorate with the only signifi cant upgrade since 1986 being the resealing 
of the main road. There are issues about the establishment of any market to facilitate the transfer of houses 
and occupation licences given restrictive conditions requiring consent of the Ngãti Whare trading enterprise 
to transfers. This situation plays out the basic tension in striking a balance between the rights of individuals 
and those held by the group. However, balanced against these diffi culties for Ngãti Whare must be a sense 
of pride at being one of very few communal owners of a village in New Zealand.
6. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In 2005 there is a new approach in Indigenous affairs administration in Australia. Alongside this new 
approach, the issues of land rights, native title and development have resurfaced. While these issues have a 
national focus from the perspective of the government’s National Indigenous Council (NIC 2005), comments 
by the Centre for Independent Studies (Hughes & Warin 2005) and by the Prime Minister (Howard 2005), 
have focused to a greater extent on remote communities and the Northern Territory.
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ALRA represents the apex of Indigenous land rights law in Australia. It is a Commonwealth statute that has 
been in place for nearly 30 years. Aboriginal land covers nearly 50 per cent of the Northern Territory and 
over 70 per cent of the Northern Territory Aboriginal population lives on Aboriginal-owned land. Given these 
features, CAEPR was commissioned to produce a report for Oxfam Australia, who sought some evidence-
based research on issues associated with potential land rights reform. 
This is not the fi rst time that ALRA has come under scrutiny since the election of the Howard government 
in 1996. In 1998, a far-reaching review by Reeves (1998) found that land rights had failed to deliver 
development. However the recommendations of this review that called for sweeping reforms of ALRA 
have not been actioned to date, perhaps because they were heavily criticised by a Parliamentary Inquiry 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1999) and by academics (see the essays in Altman, Morphy & Rowse 1999). 
Those matters do not need to be revisited here because the issue of land rights reform is now being 
approached from a different direction, with a focus on shortcomings in ALRA in delivering fi nance for 
housing and development on Aboriginal land held under inalienable communal title. What is importantly 
different in 2005 is that with the demise of ATSIC, a policy formation and service delivery organisation that 
was directly elected by Indigenous Australians, this issue is left to be articulated by the government’s own 
appointed NIC and by mainstream bureaucratic agencies. Another relevant factor is that from 1 July 2005 
the Australian government has a Senate majority that could see reform of ALRA that was previously unlikely, 
as the wider political support for reforms was absent.
THE ALRA
With these two broad issues (housing and development) in mind, this paper examines the ALRA land use 
provisions. It has not looked in detail at Part IV of ALRA (relating to mining).
Examination of the ALRA shows:
• that many of the objectives for enhanced development and improvements to housing can be 
achieved under the existing law or with very minor modifi cations to it;
• that the scope of Ministerial powers remaining nearly 30 years after the ALRA was passed makes 
dealings in land complex from a regulatory point of view and restricts the freedoms of owners, 
through their agents, to control development and to take responsibility for their actions. In the non-
mining context at least, these powers appear excessive and burdensome today;
• that some state agencies maintain a privileged position in occupying Aboriginal land without 
payment. This practice is at odds with ideas of extending commercial business practice to Indigenous 
Australia; and,
• that no case for increased compulsory acquisition powers over Aboriginal land has yet been made 
out.
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We recommend:
• that there be more in-depth exploration with land councils and state agencies of what is legally 
possible at present with leases and sub-leases;
• that Ministerial controls over non-mining uses of Aboriginal land be wound back, and that there 
be related in-depth examination with land councils and state agencies of appropriate replacement 
accountability mechanisms; and
• that Australian and Northern Territory government dealings with traditional owners of Aboriginal 
townships be placed on a more business-like footing, including by the payment of fair rents for 
agency occupied land.
HOUSING
Examining housing issues, especially in townships on Aboriginal land, the key issue is that there is enormous 
unmet need. In urban and regional Australia this would be addressed by state agencies responsible for 
public housing. For Aboriginal communities there has been a history of under-provision in a context of 
rapid population growth and relative population stability, with over 70 per cent of the Northern Territory 
Indigenous population living on Aboriginal land. In other words, populations are growing and are not 
moving away.
Examination of the housing situation in the Northern Territory and on Mãori land in New Zealand 
shows:
• that historically there has been a particular form of housing provision on Aboriginal land, based on 
grants-funding of community housing. This has resulted in very low rates of home ownership that are 
now regarded as problematic;
• that there is considerable evidence that state investment in housing and infrastructure has been 
inadequate and will need to increase dramatically to deal with backlogs and high population 
growth;
• that individualising title or even occupancy rights will not result in a sudden infl ow of commercial 
fi nance for housing due to the lending requirements of commercial banks, the relative poverty of 
Aboriginal people living on Aboriginal land, and the relatively high costs of housing; and,
• that the costs of individualising Mãori land in New Zealand, including fragmentation to uneconomic 
parcels and successions, should be kept in mind alongside more recent and positive developments to 
encourage housing on multiply-owned land via licences to occupy portions of the land.
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We recommend:
• reform that will lead to rapid enhanced investment in community housing to meet the unmet and 
forecast needs identifi ed by the Northern Territory government;
• examination of options to enhance overall household income in Aboriginal communities as a 
necessary precursor to improved and sustainable housing either in community or private ownership; 
and
• exploration with land councils and state agencies of structural options for the enhanced provision 
of community housing and public and private housing that includes making the accountabilities of 
landowners and residents better articulated and better understood. Such options could include: 
• community housing involving partnerships, or signifi cant fi nancial relationships, with 
state agencies and/or the private sector;
• public housing on land leased from traditional owners to allow it to be debt fi nanced 
by government; and
• private housing via leases and sub-leases where household income levels make this 
viable and where it is sought. 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Examining economic development on Aboriginal land requires adjusting mainstream assumptions in 
order to confront the challenges of remoteness and the low commercial value of much of this land, 
and to take account of the aspirations of Aboriginal land owners. It is land that remains relatively intact 
environmentally.
A consideration of economic factors leads us to conclude that:
• accessing capital is not an issue of the highest order in the context of the many barriers to 
development posed by remoteness, absence of economies of scale, and historical legacies. There 
has been limited debate about what might constitute appropriate development on Aboriginal land. 
Many of the existing contributions to the debate are from people who appear to have little direct 
experience of remote situations; 
• those who argue that communal inalienable title is renowned for being sub-optimal for raising 
commercial fi nance fail to look at the particular features of remote Australia in order to critically 
evaluate what development is possible and whether individualised land tenure is in fact necessary to 
achieve possible development options;
• the same point can be made about the need to critically examine whether individualised tenure is 
compatible with Indigenous aspirations. Those aspirations frequently prioritise kin-based, communal 
decision-making;
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• there is little recognition of the forms of development already occurring on Aboriginal land that do 
refl ect local realities and aspirations. There is similarly little remuneration for activities that generate 
national benefi t and that could readily be re-defi ned as employment;
• communal ownership does make investment complex and generates high transaction costs. 
However, as with housing issues, some ALRA provisions including anachronistic ministerial approval 
requirements add further and unwarranted administrative complexities to investment on Aboriginal 
land; and,
• paradoxically, mechanisms in the ALRA that generate capital from mining on Aboriginal land, the 
most promising economic benefi t from much of this land, are channelled to the ABA. This capital 
could be used more innovatively for development on Aboriginal land.
We recommend:
• that diverse Indigenous aspirations for development on Aboriginal land be more clearly articulated, 
acknowledged and considered in public debates;
• that greater emphasis be placed on what mainstream commercial development is realistically possible 
on Aboriginal land and how environmentally, economically and socially sustainable such development 
might be;
• that greater recognition and more equitable state resourcing of successful development projects on 
Aboriginal land be explored, especially in the customary sector and in natural and cultural resource 
management;
• that debate about innovative forms of development fi nance for Aboriginal development be promoted, 
including profi t-related loan schemes and no interest loan schemes where there are social as well as 
economic benefi ts and where there are positive national benefi ts; and,
• that debate occur on whether the circa $100 million accumulated reserves held by the ABA should 
be placed under Aboriginal control and be more readily available for development (via grants and/or 
loans) on Aboriginal land.
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NOTES
1. Northern Territory Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Environment, Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern 
Territory) Act, Summary <http://www.ipe.nt.gov.au/whatwedo/indigenousland/pdf/lclaim.pdf> [accessed 22 
June 2005].
2. In addition there have been acquisitions by the Indigenous Land Corporation (ILC) since 1995 and pockets of land 
granted as excisions or community living areas under the Pastoral Land Act 1992 (NT).
3. Altman (1996) and Taylor (1999) have noted that there is no offi cial statistical basis upon which to measure the 
impact of land rights on Indigenous socioeconomic status.
4. The visit was in the week of 3–8 April 2005. It followed a February 2005 address by the Minister for Indigenous 
Affairs (Senator Vanstone) to the National Press Club that highlighted the apparent inability of land rights to 
deliver socioeconomic outcomes and made clear that the Australian Government was contemplating changes to 
land rights.
5. The Prime Minister’s address is available at <http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/speech1406.html>.
6. In discussions about the Northern Territory we generally use the term ‘Aboriginal’.
7. An international focus on other settler colonies was included in our brief and, serendipitously, an expert legal 
researcher from New Zealand (Craig Linkhorn) was visiting CAEPR. The New Zealand experience provides positive 
comparative information. We did not delve into the complexities of Canada and the USA at this juncture beyond 
reviewing basic information about the block grant housing program for indigenous land in the USA and the guide 
produced by the Bank of Montreal concerning indigenous borrowers.
8. The ALRA may need amending if Ministerial consent to land dealings is retained as at present for situations where 
consent is obtained for a purpose restricted to Aboriginal people but the grantee of that land interest wants to 
create a subsidiary interest, say a mortgage, in favour of a non-Aboriginal person.
9. Part IV of the ALRA was the subject of extensive review conducted by the Australian government, the Northern 
Territory government and Indigenous land councils in 2003–04.
10. Since 1998, the Northern Territory Land Acquisition Act has allowed the Crown to acquire land compulsorily for 
‘any purpose whatsoever’. This was a response to the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cwlth), which permitted 
the compulsory acquisition of native title for private purposes where other titles are similarly permitted to be 
acquired by law. However, the Native Title Act does not require that in practice both native title and other titles 
be so acquired, and it remains to be seen whether these powers will be used to acquire native title more than other 
titles.
11. An Indigenous Household is a household where any family in the household is defi ned as an Indigenous family 
or a lone person household where the lone person is of Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander origin. Group 
households are not included. An Indigenous Family is one where either the reference person and/or spouse/partner 
is of Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander origin. This is the standard defi nition in the 2001 Census Dictionary.
12. Although housing and infrastructure provision is primarily the responsibility of state and territory government, 
in the Northern Territory the Commonwealth Government is the major source of funding for Indigenous housing 
(Sanders 2005).
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13. As will be discussed later, much of this land does have signifi cant biodiversity conservation value as landscapes are 
relatively intact.
14. Data from the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Survey 2002.
15. The Census records gross income but for the purpose of this exercise we assume that none of the household 
members are in paid employment and their after-tax income is the same as their gross income. This income level 
seems low for a family of this composition who rely on income support and would receive a pension or allowance 
plus substantial amount of Family Tax Benefi t Part A and B. However, for the purposes of this paper we take the 
census data on incomes in very remote areas in the Northern Territory at face value.
16. Calculations from the Commonwealth Bank of Australia Home Loan Calculators <http://www.commbank.com.au> 
[accessed 23 June 2005].
17. In addition to low employment rates and incomes, there are a number of other factors which are likely to make 
it diffi cult for Indigenous people in remote areas of the Northern Territory to borrow money from a commercial 
lender. For example, there is often a substantial movement of occupants into and out of a dwelling. This means 
there can be substantial fl uctuations in household incomes. This can be problematic since in order to have a high 
enough household income to pay back a substantial mortgage a number of adults will need to agree to contribute 
to the loan repayments. 
18. For example in Wadeye the average number of residents per house is 16 (Taylor & Stanley 2005) and in Maningrida 
it is between 15 and 20 persons per house owing to substantial seasonal variation and movement between 
township and outstations (Altman, calculation based on discussion with Town Clerk, June 2005).
19. There is a 20-year gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous life expectancies. At the Good Shepherd Micro 
Credit conference in Melbourne (9–10 June 2005) a major difference noted between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous borrowers under the no interest loans scheme (NILS) was that Indigenous borrowers were more likely 
to default over a short repayment period of 12 months owing to unexpected death.
20. Rental assistance is available as a supplementary payment to people receiving other support and who rent 
private or community-rental dwellings. Income-related rents are available to tenants of public housing. Rental 
assistance contributes money towards rent over a threshold up to a maximum (currently $80 per week threshold 
with a maximum of $100 assistance (dollar for dollar matching to a top rent of $280). The Northern Territory 
Government (2004:17) provides nationwide data that indicates that Commonwealth Rent Assistance—the 
Australian Government’s largest housing program—is not accessed on an equitable (needs) basis by Indigenous 
people.
21. Mãori freehold land is land the benefi cial ownership of which has been determined by the Mãori Land Court by 
freehold order.
22. By way of general context the 2001 Census records show 86 per cent of Mãori live in urban areas and that 
approximately 30% of Mãori aged 15 years and over own or partly own their usual place of residence (see 
<http://www.statistics.govt.nz>). Private housing stock, on general land, owned by Mãori in the major urban and 
regional centres away from their tribal lands is not the focus of this discussion. Sanders (2005) gives ownership by 
dwellings containing Indigenous households in Australia as 28.2 per cent in 2001. These statistics are not directly 
comparable.
23. In broad terms, unless altered by will, succession to Mãori land is generally by all children equally to their parent’s 
estate.
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24. One of these products (Kiwibank Welcome Home Loan) contains options for no deposit as well as low deposit 
lending and will consider up to six sources of household income where people living in an extended family 
situation want to purchase a house. Loan insurance matching outstanding debt is available (payment in full on 
death of outstanding balance; repayments for up to two years for loss of work because of illness or injury).
25. Tribal groups may apply to HNZC for a grant, low interest loan or capital funding from the Housing Innovation 
Fund. This is designed to assist non-profi t groups increase their involvement in provision of rental housing or 
home ownership for low-income households where the private market is not meeting demonstrated needs. An 
example would be where a tribe wanted to develop housing for elders near the tribe’s traditional meeting house 
complex (marae). Te Puni Kõkiri (Ministry of Mãori Development) and HNZC collaborate on a Special Housing 
Action Zones programme. This programme is to assist communities to repair or build housing. Te Puni Kõkiri funds 
a Community Housing Plan that identifi es needs and community resources (e.g. labour) and recommends a way 
forward. HNZC loans funds for capital expenditure to implement the plan (see <http://www.hnzc.co.nz> and 
<http://tpk.govt.nz>).
26. There is resistance by private-sector housing lenders to accept Mãori freehold land as adequate security for such 
loans which are typically granted by state lending institutions. There is not room to explore this ‘market failure’ 
here.
27. See the Habitat for Humanity website <http://www.hnzc.co.nz>.
28. New Zealand Ministry of Works (1987), Feasibility Study on the Possible Transfer of Minginui to the Whakatane 
District Council, cited in Hutton (2004).
29. Title to the land was vested in the tribe’s eponymous ancestor Wharepakau to be administered by trustees (Te Amo 
2004).
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